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MAKING METHOD VISIBLE:
IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF
SCIENCE-BASED REGULATION
Pasky Pascual,* Wendy Wagner** & Elizabeth Fisher***
Scientific inferences are theories about how the world works that scientists
formulate based on their observations. One of the most difficult issues at the
intersection of law and science is to determine whether the weight of evidence
supports one scientific inference versus other competing interpretations of the
observations. In administrative law, this difficulty is exacerbated by the behavior
of both the courts and regulatory agencies. Agencies seldom achieve the requisite
visibility that explains the analytical methods they use to reach their scientific
inferences. Courts—because they appreciate neither the variety of inferential
methods nor their epistemic foundations—do not demand this level of visibility
from the agencies.
We argue that much progress can be made toward visible, coherent, sciencebased regulations if courts ask two deceptively simple questions: (1) have the
agency’s inferential methods been identified? and (2) does the agency explain
how its methods are appropriate to the information on hand and how the
methods support the agency’s inferences?
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INTRODUCTION
In 2001, hours after the Ernsts dined at the Olive Garden restaurant
where they first dated, Robert—exercise fanatic, triathlete, marathon
runner—died of an apparent heart attack.1 “It didn’t make sense to me that
he could have died like that from a heart problem,” said his wife, Carol.2
Scouring the Internet, she discovered that Vioxx, the painkilling drug her
husband had started taking, might be linked to cardiac arrest.3 She filed suit
against Merck & Co., makers of Vioxx. After the jury awarded Carol more
than $250 million in damages,4 Merck’s defense team insisted the company
acted responsibly “from researching Vioxx prior to approval in clinical
trials . . . to monitoring the medicine while it was on the market, to
voluntarily withdrawing the medicine when it did.”5 Yet even with these
precautions, a scientist at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
estimated that Vioxx caused roughly 55,000 deaths after the FDA approved
it for market.6
Unfortunately, the deaths from Vioxx are only one example of how
drugs that have been approved by the FDA may nevertheless lead to unex1.
Alex Berenson, In First of Many Vioxx Cases, a Texas Widow Prepares to Take the
Stand, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2005, at C1.
2.
Kevin McCoy, Merck to Face First Vioxx Trial Before Texas Jury Next Month, USA
TODAY (June 29, 2005), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/drugs/
2005-06-29-vioxx-cover-usat_x.htm.
3.
Id.
4.
The trial court’s judgment was reversed on appeal. Merck v. Ernst, 296 S.W.3d 81
(Tex. App. Houston 2009), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1980 (2012).
5.
Marc Kaufman, Merck Found Liable in Vioxx Case, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2005, at
A01.
6.
Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Failing in Drug Safety, Official Asserts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2004, at A1 (based on Dr. David Graham’s testimony before the Senate Finance Committee,
available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/111804dgtest.pdf).
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pected deaths, sometimes at considerable levels. Indeed, researchers estimate that roughly one out of every five FDA-approved drugs are likely to
be linked to serious adverse side effects,7 risks that were not detected during
the $1 billion-plus testing and oversight of each drug that is required for
FDA approval.8 The conventional explanation offered for this alarming gap
in public health protection is that the clinical trials cannot detect all of the
potential adverse effects due to the small size of the tested populations.9
While this may be partially true, we maintain that the FDA’s failure to flag
the link between Vioxx and the risk of cardiac arrests stemmed from a fundamental misunderstanding of the methods of scientific inference, which
might have been avoided if these methods had been more visible to the
regulatory community—including agencies, regulated entities, nongovernmental organizations who serve as watchdogs over regulations, and
the courts.
Scientific inferences are theories about how the world works, which
scientists formulate on the basis of their observations.10 Such inferences are
inevitably replete with uncertainties. Alternative theories can explain the
same set of observations. Moreover, observations can often be incomplete
and can sometimes be imprecise or inaccurate. Scientists must therefore
rely on various analytical methods to evaluate the concordance between
observations and the competing theories used to explain them.11 We argue
that the FDA promulgated only one among these various methods as the
evidentiary standard to evaluate drug risk. Once it did so, this method
evolved into a regulatory process—unexamined, unquestioned, and for the
most part, invisible to the regulatory community—regardless of whether
7.
See, e.g., Karen E. Lasser et al., Timing of New Black Box Warnings and Withdrawals
for Prescription Medications, 287 JAMA 2215, 2216 (2002) (estimating that 20 percent of all
new drugs are likely to have serious or life-threatening adverse effects within the first
twenty-five years of use that will either be unknown or undisclosed at the time of drug
approval). It has also been estimated that 250,000 adverse drug experiences (ADEs), i.e.,
adverse events that occur when drugs are used in professional practice, are reported to the
FDA each year. It has been further estimated that costs associated with ADE-related mortality and morbidity exceed $75 billion annually and that ADEs are among the top ten causes
of death. Syed Rizwanuddin Ahmad, Adverse Drug Event Monitoring at the Food and Drug
Administration, 18 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 57, 57 (2003).
8.
See, e.g., Steven M. Paul et al., How to Improve R&D Productivity: The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Grand Challenge, 9 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 203, 205 (2010), available
at http://www.nature.com/nrd/journal/v9/n3/full/nrd3078.html (discussing the high costs of
drug testing).
9.
See, e.g., Lasser et al., supra note 7, at 2218 (concluding that adverse effects appear
for new drugs because “[p]remarketing drug trials are often underpowered to detect ADRs,
and have limited follow-up”).
10.
RAY HILBORN & MARC MANGEL, THE ECOLOGICAL DETECTIVE: CONFRONTING
MODELS WITH DATA 12 (1997).
11.
Id.
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this particular method was suitable to the observations on hand.12 Indeed,
with the benefit of hindsight from Vioxx, Congress in 2007 passed legislation to amend the FDA’s incomplete approach and to provide the FDA
with the authority to establish the infrastructure needed to collect observations that lend themselves to a broader set of inferential methods.13
The problems with the FDA’s drug approval program before the 2007
legislation, as well as other problems in areas of environmental and health
regulation, arose from a very simple but unappreciated problem—the failure to make methods visible as part of the regulatory process. The visibility
we prescribe amounts to little more than requiring agencies to explicate and
justify the choice of one inferential model over another. Rarely do agencies
compare, explain, or justify these inferential techniques when synthesizing
the scientific evidence that serves as the basis for regulatory decisions. As
the Vioxx case and many other unfortunate regulatory fallouts attest, however, the consequences of hidden inferential methods can be potentially
significant. As long as the basis for science-intensive regulatory decisions is
obscure, the potential for errors and incomplete analyses on fundamental
decisions such as risk prevention remains unnecessarily high.
Visible methods open up an agency’s decisionmaking to scrutiny, both
internal and external, in a way that would not be possible otherwise. Once
agency staff are expected to make their methods visible, such methods
would not be made implicitly or by default, or without a careful consideration of alternatives. Perhaps more importantly, requiring methods to be
visible would shift the courts’ oversight role toward insisting on explanations rather than evaluating individual agency choices themselves, except
with respect to their fit within the statutory frame. Finally, visible methods
would refocus the full range of regulatory participants on the methodological choices available and the importance of selecting the best inferential
methods for the task at hand. In short, making methods visible highlights
the “means” of the decisionmaking or how inferences are derived from data,
rather than on the outcomes or “ends” of regulatory deliberations.
While these methods of scientific inference may seem far outside the
domain of most lawyers, we argue that the legal system in general and the
courts in particular are partly to blame for the deficiencies in the agencies’
lack of methodological transparency. The process of judicial review has not
only been complicit in allowing the agencies’ methods of inferring risks and
synthesizing evidence to fall out of sight, but has actually aggravated the
tendency by making methods largely irrelevant to the basic mechanisms

12.
See infra Part I.
13.
Food And Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121
Stat. 823.
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used to hold agencies accountable.14 What is worse, when decisionmakers do
develop detailed, visible methods, the legal system provides little reward or
encouragement for such efforts. If anything, contemporary statutory
requirements and mechanisms for judicial review can actually serve to
penalize this methodological candor through misguided second-guessing.15
Of even greater concern, there is virtually no debate within legal arenas
about the nature and importance of methods of scientific inference. Few
lawyers will have ever thought about the methods by which scientific findings are inferred from data.16 Lawyers have instead treated scientific
analysis as a “truth machine”17 which produces answers but they have not
felt the need to scrutinize how the machine actually works. Frameworks
such as “risk assessment”18 might give the appearance of a method, but in
fact are merely general decisionmaking frameworks derived from concerns
over administrative legitimacy19 and imposed upon regulatory science as
part of the administrative process. To use an analogy, it is as if the work of
common law courts were simply understood in terms of the results of
decided cases rather than the reasoning deployed by judges. To do this is to
miss a significant aspect of the legal method; as lawyers, we not only focus
on judicial method, but also see the visibility of such method as a virtue of
judicial reasoning. A judgment that provides no reasoning or provides
reasoning that is opaque is problematic, and there is a rich discourse about
the nature and quality of legal methods.20 All the same is true in relation to
methods of inference in science.
Once the methods are made visible, scientists, policymakers, and interested participants will be forced to grapple with identifying the most robust
14.
See infra Part II.
15.
See infra Part II.
16.
There are notable exceptions, however. See, e.g., Steve C. Gold, A Fitting Vision of
Science for the Courtroom, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2013) (Rutgers Sch. of
Law-Newark, Paper No. 118, 2012) (arguing that in reviewing the admissibility of expert
weight of the evidence testimony under Daubert, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in
Milward rightly demanded rigorous explanations and methods to support the experts’
inferences, rather than direct testing), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2101454.
17.
Wendy Wagner, Elizabeth Fisher & Pasky Pascual, Misunderstanding Models in
Environmental and Health Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. ENV. L.J. 293 passim (2010).
18.
COMM. ON THE INST. MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB. HEALTH,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING
THE PROCESS (1983), available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=366&page=1.
19.
ELIZABETH FISHER, RISK REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
ch. 3 (2007).
20.
E.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1991); MARTIN SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME
COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1968). Judicial reasoning has been a major scholarly focus in the area of risk regulation. See Richard B. Stewart, The Role of Courts in Risk
Management, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. 10208 (1986); Patricia Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts
Part of the Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 636–39 (1994).
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and comprehensive approaches to inference. While deconstruction and
ends-oriented attacks against methods remain fair game, they become a
much more difficult means of sabotage as long as critics are expected to
point to uniformly superior approaches that could replace the methodological flaws they attack. By making methods visible, the regulatory apparatus
also becomes more conditioned to finding ways to remain updated and to
evolve with improved methods. The agencies’ focus shifts towards developing the best methods, not simply developing scientific outputs that are
presented strategically in ways intended to navigate around possible
legal and political controversies and lines of attack.
We do not pretend that making methods visible is a magic wand
solution to ossification,21 the manufacturing of scientific uncertainty,22 or
analytical opportunism on the part of litigants, however.23 By drawing the
focus to how scientists draw inferences from the data, lawyers are focusing
on the most fundamental element in the rigor of science-intensive administrative decisionmaking. While we could be accused of having little
awareness of how science can be socially constructed and framed,24 such a
criticism neglects the crux of our argument; namely, that methods need to
be made more visible in the regulatory process, not more authoritative.25 As
Bruno Latour has remarked, the key problem in contemporary science
debates today is not so much that we have an “excessive confidence in ideological arguments posturing as matters of fact”—dismantling regulatory
science seems to be routine—but that instead we have “an excessive distrust
of good matters of fact disguised as bad ideological biases.”26 Making
method visible is thus not about uncovering a ‘truth machine’ but about
ensuring that a discourse takes place about what are the methods best suited
for the particular factual questions that underpin a specific regulatory
decision in an area in which there are limits to scientific knowledge.
Our overarching argument that risk regulation would be considerably
improved—on all levels—by making methods visible is developed in three
parts. Part I provides a very particularized discussion of methods, explain21.
See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1403 (1992).
22.
See generally DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT: HOW INDUSTRY’S
ASSAULT ON SCIENCE THREATENS YOUR HEALTH (2008).
23.
FISHER, supra note 19, at ch. 3.
24.
The literature on this point is a rich one. See SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE
BAR: LAW, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA (1995); BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN
ACTION (1987).
25.
See FISHER, supra note 19; Pasky Pascual, Wresting Environmental Decisions from an
Uncertain World, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10539 (2005); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in
Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995).
26.
Bruno Latour, Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters
of Concern, 30 CRITICAL INQUIRY 225, 227 (2004).
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ing what we mean by “methods”; of how scientists use a variety of methods
to draw inferences from the available information; and of why scientific
inferences can be justified only within the context of methods used to
derive them. Many lawyers might be tempted to skip or skim this Part on
the assumption that such scientific discussion is within neither their
expertise nor domain.27 We would strongly urge readers not to do this,
however; this Part lays bare some of the gaps that can arise when the
methods of analysis are invisible, as they were in relation to the FDA
approval of Vioxx. Part I concludes by discussing why the invisibility of
methods has led regulatory agencies down the path toward inconsistent
analyses of pesticide risks and untenable decisions regarding a variety of
standards, benchmarks, and regulatory pronouncements.
Part II considers why methods tend to be obscure in regulatory debates.
As already noted above, we argue that currently very little method is actually
made visible and that frameworks such as “risk assessment” and monikers
such as “sound science” serve as effective black boxes that promote the
invisibility of methods. This Part explores why such an inferior state of
affairs is institutionally tolerated.
Part III considers how methods should be made visible and then provides several illustrations on how this might be done. We argue that such
visibility can serve a range of ends, but the most significant is improving
the quality of regulatory decisionmaking. Making methods visible is
important because it is about making the reasoning process visible so it can
be assessed. This is particularly so in administrative law because reasoning
and its rigor has always been the subject’s historical focus. We conclude the
third Part by suggesting how courts can enhance the visibility of methods
by rewarding agencies for this work.
We should stress at the outset that this Article is part of a larger
inquiry into the interface between science and law that we have been carrying
out over the last few years.28 That interface has largely been characterized as
an uneasy and even unviable collaboration.29 What we have been interested
in doing is exploring how that relationship can be understood in a more
constructive way. Making method visible is a necessary, albeit not the only
step, needed to do this.

27.
Elizabeth Fisher et al., Understanding Environmental Models in Their Legal and
Regulatory Context, 22 J. ENVTL. L. 251 (2010) (critiquing that assumption).
28.
See, e.g., Wagner et al., supra note 17.
29.
See, e.g., Devra Lee Davis, The Shotgun Wedding of Science and Law: Risk Assessment
and Judicial Review, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 67, 68 (1985); Cary Coglianese & Gary E.
Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1255 (2004).
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I. METHODS AND WHY THEY MATTER
Regulatory crises such as the Vioxx tragedies, along with other
unexpected adverse events associated with approved drugs, result in part
from a tacit selection of methods at a particular point in time that outlasts
the appropriate use of those methods in consequent regulatory decisions.
Before discussing how methods matter to regulatory outcomes, however, we
first discuss what we mean by methods of inference. There are not only
choices between methods of inference, but several layers at which those
choices consistently arise. Each level of choice, moreover, can impact
regulatory outcomes, potentially exponentially.

A. What Are the Methods of Scientific Inference?
On one level, the Vioxx crisis stemmed from questions over a scientific
fact—was the drug factually safe or not? Such questions accompany virtually all major public health and safety regulations: Does chloroform in
drinking water pose risks at any concentration above zero?30 Does bisphenol
A in baby bottles give rise to risks?31 Do greenhouse gases endanger public
health and the environment?32 There has been much literature concerning
how the question of safety is not just a factual question but also a valuebased one.33 That is true, but focusing on this ignores that underlying the
factual aspects of these questions is a subtler, more fundamental scientific
issue with significant, practical consequences; ultimately, disputes over facts
have as much to do with disagreements over which methods establish the
most believable and most scientifically trustworthy description of the
data.34

30.
In Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the court
remanded EPA’s drinking water standard for chloroform of 0 parts per million because some
evidence suggested there was a safe threshold for cancer risk.
31.
The FDA ruled that baby bottles and children’s drinking cups could no longer
contain BPA, although it did so based on the industry’s abandonment of BPA in the manufacture of those items. Indirect Food Additives: Polymers, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,899, 41,902 (July
17, 2012) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 177). The FDA continues to study the safety risks
of BPA. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BISPHENOL A (BPA): USE IN FOOD CONTACT APPLICATION,
FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ucm064437.htm (last updated
Apr. 2, 2012).
32.
See Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 121 (D.C. Cir.
2012).
33.
E.g., K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, BURYING UNCERTAINTY: RISK AND THE CASE
AGAINST THE GEOLOGICAL DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE 27–102 (1993); Steven Rayner
& Robin Cantor, How Fair Is Safe Enough? The Cultural Approach to Societal Technology Choice,
7 RISK ANALYSIS 3 (1987).
34.
See M.P. Lynch, Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Incommensurability, in SOCIAL
EPISTEMOLOGY 262, 262–64 (A. Haddock et al. eds., 2010).
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Every rigorous discipline has methods that practitioners use to evaluate
the quality of work conducted within their domain. Law is no exception. In
countries practicing civil law, judges reach their decisions by applying a
code of legal principles to the litigation at hand. Judges operating within a
system of common law analyze the case history of past judicial opinions to
reason their way to decisions.35 Without a jurisdiction’s shared understanding of principles governing how to reach legal conclusions, there can be no
agreement on whether judicial opinions should be trusted or believed.36
While there has been a gradual acknowledgement within the law that
scientific knowledge is distinguished by information that results from the
deployment of a “scientific method,”37 much less discussed are the methods
themselves—the epistemic principles—through which scientists draw inferences from their data.38 One example of such inferential methods is the
“aspects,” essentially qualitative causal assumptions, developed by Sir
Austin Bradford Hill in 1965 to guide physicians in understanding the
causal link between disease and environmental factors. Hill proposed several
aspects for consideration: the strength or frequency of observed associations; consistency of association in varied circumstances; specificity of
association; temporal relationship between disease and posited cause; the
dose response curve between them; biological plausibility of the causal
explanation; coherence of the explanation with aspects of the disease;
experimental data; and existence of analogous causal relationships.39 Hill’s
aspects have stood the test of time. They have been widely accepted by
epidemiologists and toxicologists.40 They have also been used in numerous
judicial opinions41 and agency regulations,42 despite the fact that no
35.
BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (6th ed. 2010).
36.
This of course raises interesting and important questions about how foreign case
law is used by courts. See Stephen Yeazell, When and How U.S. Courts Should Cite Foreign
Law, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 59 (2009); Christopher McCrudden, Common Law of Human
Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 499 (2000).
37.
See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Kitzmiller v. Dover
Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 736 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (referring broadly to a method in
which explanations of natural phenomena are inferred from “confirmable data—the results
obtained through observations and experiments that can be substantiated by other scientists”).
38.
By “inference,” we mean conclusions about what the data are saying. All inferential methods are based on “first principles” which cannot be justified by a priori reasons. The
global community of scientists has gravitated towards these principles because they have
proven to be useful, to be relatively objective, to be rational, and they make reasoning visible.
39.
A.B. Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?, 58 PROC. ROYAL
SOC’Y MED. 295, 295–99 (1965).
40.
Gerard Swaen & Ludovic van Amelsvoort, A Weight of Evidence Approach to Causal
Inference, 62 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 270, 270 (2009).
41.
E.g., Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2011).
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42.
E.g., Nationall Ambient Air Quality
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Standardds for Ozone, 733 Fed. Reg. 16,4336,
a 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 58).
16,456 (March 27, 2008) (to be codified at
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scientists use qualitative factors such as those used by Hill to infer relationships between environmental and health harms and their causes. As to the
former, scientists assume axioms so that they may formally apply computational approaches and quantitatively describe these relationships. Foremost
among these axiom-based methods is probabilistic inference.43 We postpone
our discussion of probabilistic inference until Part II. For now, we only note
the existence of other axiomatic systems that are not probabilistic. For
example, some commentators argue that long-term, complex systems, such
as climate change and radioactive waste disposal, are so uncertain that their
risks can only be estimated based on opinions elicited from experts in
specific fields. These opinions are translated into numbers that can be
synthesized and computed based on axioms other than those governing
probability.44
Three insights follow from Figure 1. First and most obvious, the methods of scientific inference are varied. Yet, despite this variety, only one type
of method seems to garner the disproportionate attention of the regulatory
process. This is the method of p-values, a type of probabilistic inference. In
the words of one commentator, it is “the traditional measure of evidence,
which I think is baked into every brick of regulatory buildings.”45 It is the
method alluded to when there is an insistence upon “statistically significant”
results before giving credence to scientific evidence.46
Second, the methods outlined in Figure 1 are not mutually exclusive.
Indeed, when scientists rely on multiple studies, conducted with multiple
approaches, and the inferences derived from these studies converge around
a coherent explanation of the relationship between harm and its suspected
cause, the convergence is an indication of the strength of the evidence.
Third, to draw reliable inferences, application of a method’s axioms
should be appropriate to the data. As we discuss next, ignoring this truism
contributed to the FDA’s undervaluation of the risks from Vioxx.
43.
For technical discussions of the variety of axiom-based, inferential methods, see
George J. Klir & Richard M. Smith, On Measuring Uncertainty and Uncertainty-based Information: Recent Developments, 32 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
5 (2001) and Lofti A. Zadeh, Toward a Generalized Theory of Uncertainty (GTU)—an Outline,
172 INFO. SCI. 1 (2005).
44.
Scott Ferson et al., Summary from the Epistemic Uncertainty Workshop: Consensus
amid Diversity, 85 RELIABILITY ENGINEERING & SYS. SAFETY 355 (2004); Jon C. Helton et
al., Representation of Analysis Results Involving Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainty, 39 INT’L J.
GEN. SYS. 605 (2010).
45.
Steven N. Goodman, Introduction to Bayesian Methods I: Measuring the Strength of
Evidence, 2 CLINICAL TRIALS 282, 284 (2005).
46.
See, e.g., Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 137, 148–
49 (D. Mass 2009). This decision was overturned on appeal, when the higher court acknowledged a broader set of inferential methods should be acceptable in court. Milward, 639 F.3d
at 23–25.
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B. How Was FDA Constrained to Rely on the Method of P-values as Its
Sole Method of Making Inferences?
We return to the fate of Robert Ernst and the larger controversy
surrounding the FDA’s approval of Vioxx. To the extent that weaknesses
arose in the FDA’s program, they are suggestive of broader maladies across
agencies. Indeed, in the case of the FDA and possibly other agencies as
well, the narrow inferential frame was primarily if not exclusively the result
of legislative design rather than agency choice.
After considerable trial and error in drug regulation,47 Congress passed
the 1962 amendments to the legislation governing drug regulation, which
mandated that the FDA assess whether a drug was effective for its intended
use based on “substantial evidence” from “adequate and well-controlled
investigations.”48 This was the legislation in force during the FDA’s approval
of Vioxx, and the FDA interpreted this statute to mean that a regulatory
decision on drug effectiveness must be based on randomized, replicated,
controlled, clinical trials (RCTs).49 In essence, RCTs serve as the idealized,
traditional experiment in which experimental conditions are held constant
and homogeneous, except for the causal factors under investigation (in this
case, different levels of drug dose). It is this experimental design that justifies using the method of p-values.
The axioms of probability imply that (1) patterns in data about the
natural world can be approximated by mathematical forms—probability
distributions, of which the so-called “bell curve” is archetypical; and
(2) these forms can be manipulated computationally in order to evaluate
hypotheses about how the world operates.50 The method of p-values builds
on these axioms, as we explain in Figure 2.

47.
For some of this history see CHARLES O. JACKSON, FOOD AND DRUG
LEGISLATION IN THE NEW DEAL (1970); GUSTAVUS A. WEBER, THE FOOD, DRUG AND
INSECTICIDE ADMINISTRATION: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES, AND ORGANIZATION (1928);
David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its Substantive Contents, 6 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2 (1939).
48.
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(d), 76 Stat. 780, 781 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006)).
49.
21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2012). The initial rules adopted by FDA have evolved over
time, as described in Russell Katz, FDA: Evidentiary Standards for Drug Development and
Approval, 1 NEURORX 307, 307–09 (2004).
50.
See SCOTT M. LYNCH, INTRODUCTION TO APPLIED BAYESIAN STATISTICS AND
ESTIMATION FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS (2007) (discussing probability axioms, distributions,
and their applications).
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neous but for the causal factor being investigated.51 As explained in Figure
2, it is this experimental design that justifies the initial assumption of a
random, theoretical distribution, which serves as the basis for the p-value.
But the very steps taken to preserve the experimental conditions
demanded by the method of p-values ultimately led to the unregulated risks
from Vioxx. To preserve homogeneity in the RCTs for Vioxx, Merck
excluded older patients with previous cardiovascular disease.52 Yet, it was
precisely this cohort that was later shown to be at greatest risk.53 Moreover,
some of the variability causing differences in the response to Vioxx was
observable only at the gene level.54 This complicated the extrapolation of
RCT results to the general population. Finally, the incidence of heart
disease from Vioxx in the greater population may have been so rare as not
to have generated the low p-values needed for statistical significance. But
the rarity of the event did not minimize the consequences of risk, as Robert
Ernst’s tragedy demonstrated.
Prior to the Vioxx incident, the fact that the FDA’s methods for drug
approval were based on a limited inferential method was wholly invisible to
most policymakers and many interested parties—including drug manufacturers—that, if asked, would likely have opted for a more comprehensive or
a different form of assessment. Particularly since the FDA did not view
itself as having much legislative choice, the methods it followed had wellknown blind spots and related limitations that seemed to be wholly ignored.
Given the general invisibility of methods for inference across all agencies,
this is not surprising. Indeed, having a debate about the strengths and
weaknesses of inferential method, when such method is not visible and few
regulatory actors recognize its importance is nigh on impossible.
In hindsight, it is clear that the FDA need not have used an exclusive
inferential method to evaluate drug risk. As shown in Figure 1, scientific
inference typically proceeds down multiple paths. It was only after considerable oversight hearings, scientific review, and agency self-reflection that a
more comprehensive approach to scientific inference came to light for the
FDA. Shortly after the Vioxx recall, the National Academy of Sciences’
(NAS) Institute of Medicine (IOM) issued a report clearly stating what
others had been saying for some time: the FDA’s pre- and post-approval

51.
See Steven N. Goodman, Toward Evidence-Based Medical Statistics. 1: The P Value
Fallacy, 130 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 995 (1999).
52.
James M. Ritter et al., Precaution, Cyclooxygenase Inhibition, and Cardiovascular Risk,
30 TRENDS PHARMACOLOGICAL SCI. 503, 504 (2009).
53.
Id.
54.
Christine G. St Germaine et al., Genetic Polymorphisms and the Cardiovascular Risk
of Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs, 105 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 1740, 1740, 1743–44
(2010).
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practices were unlikely to detect rare but serious drug risks.55 Pre-approval,
RCTs simply did not generate all the information needed to assess risks
that arise when the general population is exposed to a drug.56 Post-approval,
the FDA did not possess the statutory authorities needed to implement a
nationwide system to gather this information.57 Indeed, the terms pre- and
post-approval (or their synonyms, pre- and post-market) were not a useful
construct to understand drug risks. In its stead, the IOM report advocated
assessing safety over a drug’s life cycle, in which data were to be continuously gathered from multiple sources for ongoing analyses.58
In response to recommendations such as these, in 2007 Congress passed a
statute that attempted to expand the FDA’s evidentiary base and to encourage the FDA to adopt additional methods of inference to help identify risks
that might go undetected by traditional drug testing. First, Congress directed the FDA to establish a network of data systems to integrate any and
all information to evaluate drug risks.59 Second, Congress provided the
FDA with new, extensive authorities to require post-market submission of
this information.60 In interpreting these authorities, the FDA has stated
that it can request this information if it will help assess serious drug risks, if
it is unavailable in the FDA’s network of data systems, and if the request is
based on scientific data the agency deems appropriate.61 The types of
information that the FDA can request from drug manufacturers are farranging: observational epidemiologic studies; electronic medical records
and administrative health care claims; meta-analyses based on clinical trials
or observational studies; and in vitro and in vivo laboratory studies involving
animals.62 In brief, the evidentiary paradigm for the FDA’s drug evaluation
now goes beyond any single study or RCT, however well designed, and
integrates evidence generated across multiple investigations.
The FDA’s 2007 legislation was a necessary, but far from sufficient,
step toward coherent, science-based decisions. It prompted the FDA to
55.
See COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYSTEM, INST. OF
MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND
PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 37–38, 106–09 (A. Baciu et al., eds., 2007).
56.
Id. at 37.
57.
Id. at 153.
58.
See id. at 169.
59.
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85,
§ 905, 121 Stat. 823, 944 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)–(4) (2006)).
60.
Id. § 901(a), 121 Stat. at 922–26 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)–(p)).
61.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY: POSTMARKETING STUDIES AND CLINICAL TRIALS—IMPLEMENTATION OF
SECTION 505(O)(3) OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 6 (2011), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances
/UCM172001.pdf.
62.
Id. at 7–10.
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assess drug risk using inferential methods beyond RCTs and p-values.
However, as we stated earlier, scientific inferences are unavoidably uncertain because observations are imperfect and because alternative theories can
be used to explain identical sets of observations.63 The most challenging
aspect of scientific inference—the challenge that lies at the intersection of
law and science—is to determine which combination of data and methods
best contributes to the weight of evidence supporting one inference versus
other competing inferences.64
As we discussed earlier, the scientific community relies on multiple
inferential methods, with each method resting on its own particular set of
epistemic foundations.65 Congress has neither the omniscience nor the
competence to prescribe the appropriate method for every possible scenario
requiring an evaluation of public health or environmental risks.
What we suggest therefore is that, when agencies issue regulatory decisions based on science, they must use inferential methods that are both
pluralistic and visible. By “pluralistic,” we mean that agencies should openly
recognize that their methods will vary, depending on the type of observations they are using to draw their inferences. By “visible,” we argue that
agencies should explain why they have chosen particular methods and why
these methods lead to the inferences being proposed by the agencies.66
When agencies use pluralistic and visible methods, the regulatory community is put into a better position to safeguard the rationality and thus the
legality of regulatory decisions.
Embracing a broader understanding of scientific inference67 need not
lead us to the shoals of postmodern, or even post-normal,68 scientific relativism. The various methods summarized in Figure 1 must still be bound by
the admonition raised by Latour that while historically we have had “excessive confidence in ideological arguments posturing as matters of fact,”
scholars and regulatory actors now tend to have “an excessive distrust of
good matters of fact disguised as bad ideological biases.”69 As that is the
63.
See supra text accompanying note 11.
64.
See Mark L. Taper & Subhash R. Lele, The Nature of Scientific Evidence: A Forward
Looking Synthesis, in THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: STATISTICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL
AND EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS 527, 528–29 (Mark L. Taper & Subhash R. Lele eds.,
2004).
65.
See supra text accompanying note 45.
66.
See infra text accompanying note 192.
67.
Justice Sotomayor, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, evinced such an
understanding, saying scientists do “not limit the data they consider to the results of
randomized clinical trials or to statistically significant evidence.” See Matrixx Initiatives Inc.,
v. Siracusano, 131 S.Ct. 1309, 1319–20 (2011).
68.
See Silvio O. Funtowicz & Jerome R. Ravetz, Science for the Post-Normal Age, 25
FUTURES 739, 739–40 (1993).
69.
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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case, we need to focus not on whether something is true, but rather whether
it is well or badly constructed.70 Are the inferences drawn by any particular
inferential method, when set against epistemic first principles, well or badly
constructed? These questions can only be answered if the methods are
visible to the regulatory community.

C. Invisible Methods in Practice
The consequence of invisible methods was manifested in the Vioxx
tragedies, but the problem and the resulting confusion and conflict run
throughout a number of regulatory processes. This Section explores how
the agencies’ failure to explicate methods of inference for their regulatory
decisions can lead to confusion and controversy.

1. Incorporating Methods into Pesticide Registration
and Species Protection
An ongoing conflict arising at the intersection of pesticide registrations
and endangered species protection offers a particularly salient example of
the regulatory conflict that can result from the agencies’ failure to make
their methods visible.71 Currently the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reach very different
conclusions from the data about the potential adverse impacts of pesticides,
as illustrated in the text box below. Although their methods are invisible,
lurking behind the agencies’ divergent choices of assumptions and models
are very different statutory instructions for assessing risks. The FWS is
tasked with preventing the extinction of endangered species, and when a
species may be adversely affected by a federal activity, the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) requires the FWS to use the “best available” evidence in
a way that gives the endangered species the benefit of the doubt.72 By contrast, in its regulatory assessment of a pesticide registration, the EPA is
required to balance the benefits of a pesticide against its costs to human
health and environment.73 This net balancing produces a much more openended framework that does not afford species the benefit of the doubt.
Instead, the species’ risks are compared against the benefits of the pesticide.
70.
Bruno Latour, An Attempt at a “Compositionist Manifesto”, 41 NEW LITERARY HIST.
471, 474 (2010).
71.
The nature of this controversy is summarized in BD. ON ENVTL. STUD. &
TOXICOLOGY, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., STATEMENT OF TASK: ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT
UNDER FIFRA AND ESA, http://dels.nas.edu/Study-In-Progress/Ecological-Risk-AssessmentUnder-FIFRA/DELS-BEST-11-01 (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
72.
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (2006).
73.
EPA must ensure that the pesticide does not present “unreasonable adverse effects
on the environment.” 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2006).
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FIGURE 3. COMPARING FWS VS. EPA JUDGMENTS ON PESTICIDE
RISKS TO ENDANGERED SPECIES74
Questions Arising in the
Scientific Analysis

FWS’s Answers

Should a study with
methodological problems be
excluded from the analysis? (e.g.,
what is the definition of “best
available science”?)

Not if part of the study does not
suffer from the methodological
problems and the findings of that
part of the study suggest risks to
endangered species.

What types of endpoints in the

Only endpoints that can be
Sub-lethal, indirect and
cumulative effects on species must measured with some precision can
be included in the analysis.
be considered.

75

studies should be considered?
How should the limited research
on chemical mixtures be
integrated into the analysis?

EPA’s Answers
Yes. Standard exclusion criteria
exclude studies that have
methodological flaws that cause
the studies to be unreliable.

The effects of chemical mixtures, There is so much variation in
as well as inactive ingredients, are mixtures that they cannot be
critical to an assessment of risks included in a reliable model.
to a species.

What types of assumptions should Liberal spray drift76 assumptions Reasonable spray drift
be included in the models when must be factored into an exposure assumptions should be factored
into an exposure model.
there is uncertainty about real
model.
world conditions?
How should the available on
species’ range be integrated into
the analysis?

The species’ range should be
measured by assuming the most
expansive range.

Population models need to adopt
reasonable assumptions and
require documentation for all
assumptions.

As Figure 3 reveals, there are important judgments at each point in the
agencies’ synthesis of the literature on pesticide risks to endangered species.
At the first step, the agency must determine which of the existing studies
inform the regulatory project and which do not. While one might imagine
74.
These differences are drawn largely from BD. ON ENVTL. STUD. & TOXICOLOGY,
supra note 71; from letters from EPA to NMFS regarding draft biological opinions on
various pesticide decisions, see Letter from Debra Edward, Dir., Office of Pesticide Programs,
to James H. Lecky, Dir., Office of Protected Res. 3–4 (Sept. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.epa.gov/espp/litstatus/effects/epa-to-nmfs.pdf; Letter from Richard P. Keigwin,
Jr., Dir., Special Review and Reregistration Div., to James H. Lecky, Dir., Office of Protected
Res. 2 (Sept. 10, 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/espp/litstatus/11-18-08-nmfsbiop.pdf; and from Telephone Interview conducted by Wendy Wagner with anonymous
FWS Staff, Endangered Species Program (Jan. 26, 2012).
75.
An endpoint is the adverse effect that a researcher measures in a toxicity study.
Mortality is one of the most straightforward endpoints. Other endpoints include various
measures of neurological effects (e.g., spontaneous locomotion of a mouse in an open field),
tumors (e.g., benign and malignant), reproductive and development effects (e.g., brain
weights of offspring at birth), etc. The challenge in toxicology is identifying one or more
endpoints for a study that can be measured reliably. Behavioral change in animals, for
example, is a much more difficult endpoint to measure as compared with mortality.
76.
Spray drift refers to how far the pesticide sprays into the environment (and
beyond the target) when it is applied. Spray drift is affected by a number of factors, including
the contents of the pesticide product, its method of application, and wind speed.
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that generic “exclusion/inclusion” criteria could be designed to sort out the
available research, even decisions about how to use the literature depend on
whether the agency seeks to afford every benefit of the doubt to the species
or instead simply to produce a replicable, “mean” answer to a question.
Choices also arise in identifying the parameters that will be used in a model.
For example, what effects should be considered in predicting adverse
impacts (e.g., sub-lethal effects or easily measured mortality) and what
pesticides should be included (e.g., the entire chemical mix or one pesticide
at a time)? Choices arise again in determining how to account for various
scenarios, such as assumptions regarding spray drift, species’ range, and
even the misuse of pesticides during application. All of these decisions are
informed by scientific and technical judgments about plausible options, yet
none is resolved by them. While Figure 3 extracts only a handful of these
choices, in regulatory assessments there are often dozens. According to one
classic NAS report, often as many as fifty significant choices can punctuate
any given effort to characterize the risks of a product.77
Although they are invisible, the agencies’ choice of methods profoundly
affects their ultimate decisions. The EPA’s approach to synthesizing the
literature often allows pesticide products to remain on the market with only
limited restrictions; the FWS’s synthesis of the same scientific research, by
contrast, leads to the opposite outcome.78 The resulting battles between the
two agencies have sparked protracted and extensive litigation by interest

77.
COMM. ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB.
HEALTH, supra note 18, at 29–33.
78.
A review of the correspondence to date between FWS and EPA on individual
pesticide decisions reveals credible and difficult technical disagreements over critical judgments that should be used in making these assessments, with resulting implications for the
ultimate pesticide licensing decisions. For example, FWS questions the viability of models
used by EPA to estimate risks to endangered species or to calculate their ranges, see Letter
from Marjorie Nelson, Chief, Branch of Consultation and HCPs, FWS, to Arthur-Jean B.
Williams, Assoc. Dir., Envtl. Fate and Effects Div., Office of Pesticide Programs, EPA (Feb.
11, 2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppfead1/endanger/litstatus/effects/atrazine/2008/
fws-nonconcur.pdf, and EPA questions the basis for various conclusions in the Biological
Opinion about adverse effects resulting from the use of pesticide products. See, e.g., Letter
from Stephen Bradbury, Dir., Office of Pesticide Programs, EPA, to James H. Lecky, Dir.,
Office of Protected Res., NMFS, (Aug. 19, 2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppfead1/
endanger/litstatus/effects/final-biop-ltr.pdf; Letter from Stephen Bradbury, Dir., Office of
Pesticide Programs, EPA, to James H. Lecky, Dir., Office of Protected Res., NMFS (June
14, 2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppfead1/endanger/litstatus/nmfs-draft-41comment.pdf. Some progress has been made in bridging these different risk assessment
approaches, however. In at least one set of pesticide reviews, EPA adjusted its registration
requirements in accord with these agencies’ biological opinions. See Letter from Richard
Keigwin, Special Review and Reregistration Div., EPA, to James H. Lecky, Dir., Office of
Protected Res., NMFS (Sept. 10, 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppfead1/
endanger/litstatus/11-18-08-nmfs-biop.pdf.
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groups.79 Ultimately, the two agencies commissioned the NAS to serve as
referee on the best way to synthesize the evidence at the intersection of
pesticide approvals and endangered species protections.80 One of the first
tasks of the NAS will be to draw out the various methodological steps of the
analysis and then suggest how the agencies should best approach them, an
exercise that ideally will produce a coherent and visible approach to merging
the mandates.
The material above demonstrates that methods of inference and how
they relate to the statutory mandate are the source of the conflict, not
differences in the underlying evidence or even the basic agency scientific
assessments of that evidence. Specifically, because the methods that the
agencies used to reach their judgments were obscured, the clashes appeared
both more inconsistent and irreconcilable than they actually were. It is only
when the agencies unpack their inference methods and other assumptions
that the agencies’ analysis becomes accessible and can be compared across
different programs that necessarily, by statute, deploy very different
weighting factors for public policy. Many lawyers and policymakers, who
have largely understood the scientific aspects of decisionmaking as a black
box generating answers for the regulatory process, do not appreciate that
fact, however.81 That gap in understanding only serves to further heighten
the conflict and leave the core problem unresolved.

2. Incorporating Methods into How Categories of Regulated
Industries Are Defined
Another, quite different example of the invisibility of methods in regulatory decisionmaking is the approach that agencies, primarily the EPA and
OSHA, use to set technology-based standards for pollution control in air
and water.82 The EPA in particular is instructed to identify a category of
affected industries and to locate the best available pollution controls from
within that set.83

79.
See, e.g., PESTICIDES: ENDANGERED SPECIES PROTECTION PROGRAM, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/espp/litstatus/eslitig.htm (last updated May 9, 2012) (describing the
ongoing litigation).
80.
See the agencies’ charge to the NAS Committee examining ecological risk assessment under FIFRA and ESA, BD. ON ENVTL. STUD. & TOXICOLOGY, NAT’L ACAD. OF
SCI., supra note 71.
81.
A longer analysis of this problem can be found in Wagner et al., supra note 17.
82.
See generally Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 83 (2000).
83.
E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3) (2006) (requiring that emissions from existing plants
meet at least “the average emission limitation achieved by the best performing 12 percent of
the existing sources”).
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Some industry groups discovered that one way to coax the EPA to lower
the standards is to subdivide the industry into smaller and smaller categories. Steel manufacturers writ large might be required to install equipment
to reduce pollution equivalent to that used by the top 5% of the performers
in that sector; but if the EPA re-categorizes steel manufacturers into seven
different subcategories, most of the top 5% performers in the subcategories
may be much less successful in reducing pollution and the resulting pollution
control standards can be significantly compromised in some and perhaps
many of these subcategories.84
This critical methodological step—identifying how the agency defined
the larger set of affected industries—is rarely articulated or justified by the
agency, however.85 As a result, the standards are largely immune to scrutiny.

3. Incorporating Methods into Standards
Other methodological choices used by agencies have similarly remained
obscure in ways that undermine the accountability of the regulatory programs.
One example is the EPA’s routine use of average adult susceptibilities to
individual toxins to estimate mean effects of a pollutant on human health.86
Such a methodological placeholder ignores synergistic effects and hot spots;
sub-populations of extra-sensitive persons; and downplays the well-known
added susceptibility of the children and elderly.87 While gradually this

84.
See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from the
Portland Cement Manufacturing Industry, 74 Fed. Reg. 21,136, 21,140, 21,144, 21,148 (proposed May 6, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63) (discussing the permissibility
and advantages of subcategorizing industries to provide for higher emission standards for
some groups of industry and avoid shutdowns that might otherwise result from a single
emission standard, and citing Judge Williams’s concurrence as endorsement of this
approach).
85.
One example is the deeply buried discussion of the authority to subcategorize
industries to set the standards and the economic advantages to this technique in a court case
where this practice was challenged. Sierra Club v. EPA, 479 F.3d 875, 885 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(“[Although] authority to generate subcategories is obviously not unqualified . . . one legitimate basis for creating additional subcategories must be the interest in keeping the relation
between ‘achieved’ and ‘achievable’ in accord with common sense and the reasonable meaning of the statute.”) (Williams, J., concurring).
86.
See, e.g., COMM. ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT ch. 11 (1994).
87.
For an illustration in a research study for the importance of these variables, see
Philip J. Landrigan et al., Pesticides and Inner-City Children: Exposures, Risks, and Prevention,
107 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. SUPPLEMENT 431 (1999) (spotlighting through a research study
the unaccounted for synergistic effects, high levels of exposure that are unexpected, and
increased susceptibilities of children, all in a single modest study measuring pesticide exposures
to children in the inner-city).
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methodological step is being examined in more detail,88 retrospective
adjustments may be complicated as a result of the invisible methods.
In a recent review of the EPA’s formaldehyde risk assessment, the EPA
was also taken to task for obscuring its major methodological assumptions
in synthesizing the evidence and reaching key conclusions. Specifically, the
panel observed that it was difficult to understand the EPA’s assumptions
and analysis on a number of points.89 Indeed, the panel observed, these
[p]roblems with clarity and transparency of the methods appear to
be a repeating theme over the years, even though the documents
appear to have grown considerably in length. In the roughly 1,000page draft reviewed by the present committee, little beyond a brief
introductory chapter could be found on the methods for conducting
the assessment.90
The recommendations of the panel, consistent with our argument,
urged the EPA to articulate its methods more completely and accessibly.91
For example, the panel recommended that the EPA should describe
more fully the methods of the assessment, including a description of
search strategies used to identify studies with the exclusion and
inclusion criteria clearly articulated and a better description of the
outcomes of the searches (a model for displaying the results of literature searches is provided later in this chapter) and clear descriptions
of the weight of evidence approaches used for the various noncancer
outcomes.92
Even monetizing the impacts of pollutants and other stresses on public
health and the environment under Executive Order No. 12,866 suffers from
methodological black boxes.93 A focus on numbers and ultimate bright-line
determinations of economic impact, without attention to developing an
explicit discourse about rigorous methods for how these estimates can be
developed, has led to analyses that appear more geared toward insulating
the agency from litigation than advancing an understanding of the costs and
88.
For EPA’s efforts to develop supplemental guidelines for estimating cancer
susceptibilities early in life, see EPA, PUB. NO. 630/R-03/003F, SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE
FOR ASSESSING SUSCEPTIBILITY FROM EARLY-LIFE EXPOSURE TO CARCINOGENS (2005)
available at http://www.epa.gov/raf/publications/pdfs/childrens_supplement_final.pdf.
89.
See COMM. TO REVIEW EPA’S DRAFT IRIS ASSESSMENT OF FORMALDEHYDE,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REVIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S
DRAFT IRIS ASSESSMENT OF FORMALDEHYDE ch. 7 (2011).
90.
Id. at 4.
91.
Id. at 14, 152.
92.
Id. at 152.
93.
See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
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benefits of regulation.94 Moreover, with the black-boxing comes unexpected
surprises once variables appear that are too important to ignore in future
analyses. An example would be the potentially greater value of children and
the need to monetize losses to children differently.95

4. More General Executive Branch Directives Aimed
at Scientific Integrity and Transparency
Highlights from some of the leading governmental directives further
underscore just how pervasive this invisibility of methods is in contemporary regulation. In President Obama’s memorandum and Office of Science
and Technology Policy (OSTP) Director John Holdren’s accompanying
directive on government scientific integrity, the term “method” is never
mentioned, and the concept of methods as a critical ingredient to ensuring
both rigor and candor in the agencies’ science discussions is wholly
ignored.96 Even in the agencies’ own guidelines for improving scientific
integrity, there is little movement toward making methods more visible or
rigorous. Agencies instead focus their efforts on shoring up scientific
misconduct programs (for fraud) or providing staff scientists with access to
the press.97 While these are important reforms, requiring agencies to identify
and defend their methods of analysis seems at least as important for ensuring
the integrity of regulatory science.98
94.
See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The Clean Air Interstate Rule’s Regulatory Impact Analysis: Advocacy Dressed up as Policy Analysis, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 56,
56–57 (Richard Morgenstern et al. eds., 2009).
95.
See, e.g., Sean H. Williams, Statistical Children, 30 YALE J. REG. (forthcoming
2013) (discussing how research on the value of children alters the way their losses should be
calculated, which in turn could lead to considerable revamping of regulatory analyses for past
and future regulations).
96.
Memorandum on Scientific Integrity, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,671 (Mar. 11, 2009); Memorandum on Scientific Integrity from John P. Holdren, Assistant to the President for Sci. &
Tech. and Dir. of the Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, for the Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies pt. V (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/
ostp/scientific-integrity-memo-12172010.pdf [hereinafter Holdren, Scientific Integrity Memo].
97.
See, e.g., WENDY E. WAGNER, SCIENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS: A
STUDY OF AGENCY DECISIONMAKING APPROACHES 64–78 (draft Feb. 27, 2012),
http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/02/COR-Science-Project-Report2-27-12-CIRCULATED-TO-COMMITTEE.pdf.
98.
In its revised guidance for agency “risk assessments”, for example, the Office of
Management and Budget provides no reference to the need for a discussion of competing
methods of inference, nor does OMB require the agencies to articulate how they synthesized
the literature or developed their predictive models. See, e.g., Memorandum on Updated
Principles for Risk Analysis from Susan Dudley, Admin., Office of Info. and Regulatory
Affairs, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, and Sharon L. Hays, Assoc. Dir. & Deputy Dir. for
Sci., Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
(Sept. 19, 2007), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/regulatory_
matters_pdf/m07-24.pdf. One sentence of the twelve-page memo urges agencies to explicate
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II. WHY METHODS ARE INVISIBLE
As the prior section makes clear, the invisibility of methods is not
unique to the FDA, but can be seen across U.S. regulation. In these regulatory settings, moreover, policymakers, courts, and interest groups within the
regulatory state all tend to focus their arguments and oversight primarily on
regulatory outputs and/or overarching regulatory frameworks, rather than
on the agencies’ methods of reaching decisions.
This Part considers these institutional forces in some detail. Even
though at its core the regulatory process is preoccupied with the rationality
of decisions, what can be seen overall is the way in which regulatory processes have evolved in ways that make methods of inference invisible in
regulatory debates.

A. Conventional Misunderstandings and Methodological Complacency
Among Lawyers
One of most significant reasons that methods have been ignored is
misguided impressions by the legal and policymaking communities that the
methods of inference used by scientists lie beyond their expertise and thus
are something to be avoided.99 Thus, while the results of research are viewed
as fair game for challenge, the way in which those results are generated are
not. Such a misperception is not surprising. Issues of scientific inference do
require expertise—a fact that anyone reading Part I would have felt acutely
aware of—but to avoid these issues for this same reason is badly mistaken.
Inferring from facts is part of the inherent rationality of a decision,100 and
the rationality of decision has been a constant theme in the history of the
development of U.S. risk regulation.101 Indeed, the search for rationality in
regulation has been the force behind legislative reform,102 executive oversight,103 and judicial review.104 Yet the search for rationality, at least within
existing legal frameworks, stops quite short of considering methods of

their assumptions, judgments, inferences, and methods. Id. at 11. That is the only mention
made of the need for agencies to extract their methods, including their methods of inference,
and to make them explicit and accessible for comment.
99.
Fisher et al., supra note 27, at 264.
100.
Id. at 267–70.
101.
See the analyses in COMM. ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDOUS AIR
POLLUTANTS, supra note 86, at ch. 2, and in NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND
DECISIONS: ADVANCING RISK ASSESSMENT ch. 2 (2009).
102.
See infra Part II.B.3.
103.
See THOMAS MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991).
104.
Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between
Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 227 (1996).
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inferences.105 While there are inherent challenges in understanding methods
that lie on the other side of the disciplinary divide,106 this does not mean
that such methods are not important.
Second and relatedly, lawyers and policymakers have tended to presume risk assessment is a scientific method in and of itself, so that
fundamental questions about how scientific analysis should be carried out
are hidden from view.107 Discourses about risk assessment have dominated
risk regulation over the last two decades,108 but there is little appreciation
that these discourses have primarily been driven by concerns over administrative legitimacy rather than being explicit discourses about how best to
infer conclusions from facts.109 Indeed, in much of this discussion, science is
largely understood as an input into the decisionmaking process that equates
to the truth,110 a perception that obscures the complexity of methods and
wrongly assumes that the methods are well established. In fact, in some
policy circles there is an assumption that these terms are themselves methods.
They are not, however, and as the National Research Council noted in 1994:
105.
Prior commentary hovers around the importance of methods, but never lands on
it squarely. As Judge Leventhal of the District of Columbia Circuit of the United States
asked in 1976, “[w]hat does, and should, a reviewing court do when it considers a challenge
to technical administrative decisionmaking?” Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,68 (D.C. Cir.
1976). That question led to a debate between him and Judge Bazelon over the nature of “hard
look” review. Id. Edley has described Bazelon and Leventhal “as talking about two sides of
the same coin, that coin being judicial activism motivated by a concern for sound governance.” CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREAUCRACY 227 (1990).
106.
Fisher et al., supra note 27, at 277–79.
107.
This concern is raised in reports such as COMM. ON HAZARDOUS RISK OF AIR
POLLUTANTS, supra note 86, and NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 101. See generally
Wagner, supra note 25.
108.
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 101; see also COMM. TO REVIEW THE
OMB RISK ASSESSMENT BULLETIN, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENTIFIC REVIEW OF
THE PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT BULLETIN FROM THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET (2007); 1 PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMM. ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND
RISK MGMT., FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RISK MANAGEMENT (1997).
109.
See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, The Songlines of Risk, 8 ENVTL. VALUES 135, 137 (1999);
FISHER, supra note 19, at ch. 3. Indeed, much of this discourse has been driven by a focus on
outside-in accountability, where the focus has been upon controlling public administration,
rather than inside-out accountability, which focuses on the methodology inherent within a
discipline. Sidney Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the
Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 464–66 (2012). The outside-in vision
of accountability can also be understood as promoting the rational-instrumental paradigm of
administrative constitutionalism. FISHER, supra note 19, at ch. 3.
110.
See, e.g., Wagner et al., supra note 17, at part II.A. While we did not elaborate on
how this misunderstanding also obscures the importance of methods, it is clear from the
examples we provide that policymakers tend to expect scientists and their processes to
produce definitive answers to regulatory questions, without bogging the process down in
discussions about alternative, plausible methods.
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“Risk assessment is not a single, fixed method of analysis. Rather it is a
systematic approach to organizing and analyzing scientific knowledge and
information.”111 As a result, critical decisions regarding methods of inference and for synthesizing the literature remain black-boxed while lobbyists
insist that the agency employ “peer review,” utilize “risk assessment,” or
ensure that their work is based on some form of aspirational “sound science.”

B. Reinforcing Institutional Incentives
Given the prevailing misperceptions of methods by the legal and
policymaking communities, it is no wonder that institutional oversight
processes tend to tolerate the invisibility of methods. What is perhaps more
surprising is the tendency of some institutions to actively promote this
invisibility in how they operate. These institutional problems are discussed
next.

1. Science Advisory Committees
Science advisory committees provide perhaps the single most effective
survival mechanism for an agency struggling to have its regulatory science
accepted, and yet the science advisory process can work to keep methodological discussions out of public view. Rather than ensuring that methods
are made more visible and subject to broader scrutiny, science advisory
boards sometimes do nothing more than pass the scientific assessment from
one black box process inside the agency to another, equally black box
process involving advisory board review.
As a matter of orientation, science advisory boards used by the agencies
are quite variable. Some science advisory boards are required by statutory
mandate.112 Others are employed by the agency on a program-wide or rulespecific basis.113 In most cases, agencies use the science advisors to review
their assessments and proposed rules or standards.114 When they review
111.
COMM. ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS, supra note 86,
at 4 (emphasis added).
112.
E.g., Clean Air Act § 109(d)(2)(A)–(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2)(A)-(B) (2006)
(establishing a seven-member science advisory panel to consult with EPA on its review of
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards under the Clean Air Act).
113.
See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 08-440, CHEMICAL ASSESSMENTS:
LOW PRODUCTIVITY AND NEW INTERAGENCY REVIEW PROCESS LIMIT THE USEFULNESS
AND CREDIBILITY OF EPA’S INTEGRATED RISK INFORMATION SYSTEM 13 (2008), available
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/273184.pdf (noting the participation of science advisory
boards in the review of influential risk assessments under EPA’s Integrated Risk Information
System (IRIS) program).
114.
For a richer discussion of how advisory boards do and should operate, see SHEILA
JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS chs. 5–9 (1990);
MARK R. POWELL, SCIENCE AT EPA: INFORMATION IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS (1999).
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agency products, science advisory boards can provide assessments that are
sometimes one-shot and in other cases are iterative.115
From the agency’s perspective, science advisory boards offer the promise
of insulating regulatory projects from broader attack against their scientific
reliability, and thus agencies may seek out advisors to buffer them from
these conflicts.116 As such, the agency tends to be less interested in stimulating open, frank academic debates among colleagues about the available
methodological approaches and more interested in a yes-or-no consensus on
the final regulatory decision. Agencies may even choose to design the advisory process to focus the group on their regulatory conclusions rather than
methodological alternatives. When the task is framed in this way, the science
advisors will likely comply with their assignment. Methods remain invisible
and perhaps become even more deeply embedded in the layers of scientific
review.
More recent process reforms of science advisory boards may exacerbate
this black-boxing of methods even further. The White House Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), for example, prescribes mandatory
external peer review for influential rules, yet the OMB’s detailed guidance
says little to nothing about the need for expert review of the agencies’
underlying methods.117 The apparent expectation is that an expert group
will endorse or reject the agency’s ultimate findings, rather than engage the
agency in a dialogue about its choice and explication of methods and identify
room for improvement. Most of the current regulatory commotion about
the reform of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and advisory
board review is similarly focused on the selection of experts to serve on
panels rather than ensuring that it is designed in ways that extract methods
for larger expert and public review.118
115.
See JASANOFF, supra note 114; POWELL, supra note 114 . Generally, science advisory
boards provide one-shot opinions on agency regulatory products. The EPA’s advisory board
(CASAC), which is consulted on EPA’s review of various National Ambient Air Quality
standards, is an exception to this rule. CASAC weighs in multiple times on each of EPA’s
scientific reports that supports a final revised standard. See, e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
INTEGRATED REVIEW PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR
PARTICULATE MATTER 25, fig.4.1 (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttnnaaqs/standards/
pm/data/2008_03_final_integrated_review_plan.pdf (identifying CASAC’s involvement in
EPA’s review process).
116.
See generally JASANOFF, supra note 114.
117.
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FINAL
INFORMATION QUALITY BULLETIN FOR PEER REVIEW (2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/fy2005/m05-03.pdf.
118.
See, e.g., BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., IMPROVING THE USE OF SCIENCE IN
REGULATORY POLICY 15–16, 41–42 (2009) (providing some of the most complete recommendations for the reform of science advisory boards, but dedicating very little of the
proposals to the need for agencies to make their methods more accessible and explicit for
this review).
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2. Judicial Review
Since courts provide an external check on the agency to ensure that
they have followed the requisite processes and explained their choices,119 the
courts would seem the natural institutional check to ensure that methods
have become visible in regulatory processes. The courts are where two of
the most significant standards of review—the “arbitrary and capricious” and
“substantial evidence” standards—are directly concerned with the rationality
of decisionmaking.120
Courts do require that agencies explain their decisions, and sometimes
this explanation can lead to stays in a rulemaking until the court is satisfied.121 Courts also have power over agencies that softer political processes
and interest group criticism lack. Thus, courts can provide a valuable lever
to force agencies to make methods visible.
Courts, however, have managed to provide institutional oversight in a
way that often ignores the need to force the agency to expose and explain
its underlying methodological choices.122 Thus, for example, in applying the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard of review,123 the court tends to examine
an appellant’s version of the “best available” facts and compare those facts
to those used by the agency.124 In analyzing facts, the focus tends to be upon
issues of quantification and the use of assumptions rather than upon the
choice of methods. Thus, writing for the Supreme Court in Motor Vehicle
119.
See Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
120.
Id. Note, however, that in the risk regulation field many statutes set out their own
standards of review. E.g., Clean Air Act § 307(d)(9), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) (2006); Toxic
Substances Control Act § 19(c)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 2618(c)(1)(B) (2006); Occupational
Safety & Health Act §§ 6(f), 11(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(f), 660(a) (2006). How these standards
operate is complex. See Antonin Scalia & Frank Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer
Product Safety Act, 20 UCLA L. REV. 899, 933–40 (1973); Elizabeth Fisher, The Risks of
Quantifying Justice: The Use of the Substantial Evidence Test in Judicial Review of OSHA RuleMaking, in LAW AND UNCERTAINTY, RISKS AND LEGAL PROCESSES 293, 297–306 (Robert
Baldwin ed., 1997) (explaining that “substantial evidence” was originally an adjudicative
concept, but in the OSHA context came to be defined in scientific terms).
121.
See generally Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and
Judicial Review of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 738, 778–79 (2011) (discussing how
courts seek explanations in their remands of rulemakings).
122.
It should be added that these generalizations about judicial review are just that;
there appears to be some, possibly considerable, variation around this mean. For a recent
case that emphasizes and reviews methods as opposed to outputs, see Coalition for Responsible
Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 122–23 (2012) (per curiam). Whether this latest case
signals a shift in the courts’ understanding and focus in their review of agency science
remains an open question, however.
123.
5 U.S.C. § 706.
124.
Thomas O. McGarity & Wendy E. Wagner, Legal Aspects of the Regulatory Use of
Environmental Modeling, 10 ENVTL. L. REP. 10751, 10765–68 (2003) (discussing some of the
litigation against EPA that makes this argument in the context of computational models).
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Manufacturers’ Ass’n v. State Farm Insurance Co., Justice Byron White
stressed the need for an agency to “examine the relevant data and articulate
a satisfactory explanation.”125 But while there is a resultant need to establish
a “rational connection” between the facts and the choices made, this rational
connection is not understood in terms of methods. Rather, it is more understood in terms of the factors taken into account; the plausibility of the
decision depends on whether it is understood to be “a product of agency
expertise.”126 Accordingly, the agency’s methods are relevant only to the
extent those methods invisibly support one body of evidence versus another.
Second, and reinforcing the judicial focus on “outputs,” the courts seem
to defer more heavily to agency outputs that have been reviewed and
endorsed by science advisory panels.127 By crediting this review as a plus in
assessing the “arbitrariness” of the agency’s finding, judicial review again
reinforces the black-boxing of methods through advisory review. Methods
become even more obscure and irrelevant to the test for rigorous regulatory
science.
Third and finally, some have observed that the courts seem more deferential to technical “facts” than to candid discussions about competing
assumptions and models.128 Courts defer heavily to issues that are “on the
frontiers of science,”129 for example, yet when agencies concede that they
faced policy-loaded choices in their methods, the courts sometimes scrutinize these contested decisions more rigorously. Furthermore, the focus is
often upon agencies quantifying their decisions rather than explaining their
methods.130 As a result, agencies may rightly perceive that when they
acknowledge their choices and decisions on method, they may find the
courts more, rather than less, inclined to take a “hard look” and reverse
decisions with which they disagree.
125.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
126.
Id.
127.
This observation is at this point only an aesthetic observation based on some
highly salient cases. See, e.g., Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir.
2000); see also infra notes 174–177 and accompanying text.
128.
See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity
on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J.
300, 311 (bemoaning the willingness of the court to reverse agency policy choices when they
are exposed).
129.
See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S.
87, 103 (1983) (“When examining this kind of scientific determination [i.e., one at the
“frontiers of scientific knowledge”], as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court
must generally be at its most deferential.”); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 902
F.2d 962, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (deferring to agency decisions on frontiers of scientific
knowledge), vacated in part, appeal dismissed in part, 921 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
130.
See Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
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Much of this situation is understandable and a natural response on the
part of judges to the scientific content of decisions.131 Science is not in their
area of expertise and the scope of review is limited.132 It is also perhaps due
to the historical focus in administrative rulemaking upon the significance of
a decisionmaker establishing a “rulemaking record.” In the risk regulation
context, courts have interpreted that administrative record as a purely factual
one.133 It is also the case that doctrines such as hard look review were
adapted from more generic areas where issues of scientific method were less
relevant.134 Yet that does not detract from the fact that choices over method
are not only inherent in the rationality of regulatory decisionmaking processes but also central to the question of how rational those processes are.

3. The Larger Regulatory Process
Agencies are not only bound by the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) and judicial review, but are also constrained by their authorizing
statutes and a growing list of supplemental regulatory assessment requirements.135 The invisibility of methods is thus not simply an agency creation
or a result of judicial permissiveness, but in part, and in some cases in large
part, attributable to legislative design. As a statutory matter, for example,
Congress can lock the agency into a particular method, as it did with the
FDA.136 Simply by prescribing specific rulemaking requirements, methods
become beside the point and fade into the background. While the FDA’s
drug program offers an illustrative example of this type of hard constraint,
it is not alone. Under some authorizing statutes, for example, agencies are
precluded from adopting a number of inferential approaches by statute.137
While this more limited discretion in some cases appears to make the agency’s
life easier, the narrow delegations alter the agency’s methodological choices

131.
See Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122
U. PA. L. REV. 509, 511–12 (1974).
132.
See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
133.
See Fisher, supra note 120, at 299.
134.
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
40–46 (1983) (concerning the rescinding of a seat belt regulation); Greater Boston Television
Corp. v FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850–52 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
135.
For a recent inventory of some of the more significant requirements imposed on
agencies, see CURTIS W. COPELAND, REGULATORY ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS: A REVIEW
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 13–32 (2012), available at http://www.acus.gov/
sites/default/files/COR-Final-Reg-Analysis-Report-for-5-3-12-Mtg.pdf.
136.
See supra Part I.B.
137.
The NAAQS reviews discussed infra Part III.B provide a good example of this
more limited statutory delegation. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457,
485 (2001) (interpreting the Clean Air Act to limit the discretion afforded the Administrator to
consider economic consequences of health protective standards).
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and how it can communicate them.138 Congress can also lock into place
methods for synthesizing the literature, as illustrated by the competing
approaches to pesticide evaluation taken by the FWS and the EPA.139
Additionally, both by statute and executive order, agencies must evaluate
the impacts of their future rules on a range of targets such as small businesses,140 the general economy,141 minority communities,142 etc.143 Agencies
must also be prepared to defend or subject technical information to an
appeal process when their “facts” are challenged under the Data Quality
Act.144 Each of these accountability mechanisms demand “outputs”—with
an expectation of considerable precision—that indicate whether the rule will
impact small businesses or present an undue hardship on the economy
relative to the regulatory benefits.145 The programs do not even gesture
toward the need for disclosure and explication of methods; rather they
direct agencies to provide barometer-like readings on how the rules affect
various, often conflicting features of American life.
The result of these regulatory accountability tools, again, is to focus the
agencies on presenting answers without developing or explaining their
methods. Competing methods for determining economic harms or considering the ways that rules might have adverse impacts on communities are
wholly ignored. Such a blind spot is particularly ironic given the objective of
these good government tools, which is to advance government accountability.

III. HOW TO CONSIDER METHODS
It is one thing to note that methods are invisible, but it is quite another
to imagine how the regulatory discussions would look if methods were more
centrally discussed in agency rulemakings. This is particularly difficult
when there are fundamental intellectual challenges involved in evaluating
methods in another discipline, particularly in circumstances of technical,

138.
See Cary Coglianese & Gary Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in
Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1266–74 (2004) (criticizing the Clean Air Act
for an unrealistically narrow delegation).
139.
See supra Part I.C.1.
140.
See Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2006).
141.
See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in
5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
142.
See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. § 895 (1995), reprinted as amended in
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).
143.
See generally COPELAND, supra note 135 (discussing the most taxing requirements).
144.
Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153 to -154 (2000).
145.
One need only review the final sections of any proposed and final regulations for
this checklist of applicable laws. See also COPELAND, supra note 135, at App. 2 (summarizing
the requirements cited in 100 rules).
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institutional, and political complexity.146 Given the foundational role of
methods in synthesizing scientific research to inform regulation, however,
these challenges simply cannot be brushed aside or avoided. Methods are
endemic in regulatory decisions and must be identified and confronted
head-on.
There is no room here to enter into a detailed analysis of these issues.
Our purpose here is to put the issue on the agenda for discussion. To begin
the conversation, we offer some suggestions for what the regulatory discussion might look like if methods were made part of the regulatory
discussions. The FDA experience with Vioxx demonstrates the importance
of making methodological techniques accessible to policymakers, and the
2007 FDA legislation passed in response represents an important, corrective
step that advances this recognition of the spectrum of inferential methods
sketched in Figure 1, supra.147 To provide additional illustrations of how
agencies are making methods visible, we consider the Department of
Interior’s (DOI) use of probabilistic inference to justify its decision to
classify polar bears as a threatened species under the Endangered Species
Act (ESA). We also explore the EPA’s staged approach to making methods
visible in its regulation of air pollutants under the Clean Air Act. The
section then closes with some preliminary thoughts about how the courts’
approach to judicial review might be adjusted to provide greater encouragement for agencies to place methodological discussions centrally in their
regulatory analyses and discussions.
Although there is considerable variation within different regulatory
settings, some basic themes and principles emerge from this inventory of
success stories. The examples in this section illustrate how the agency can
explain its choice of inferential methods and how it can even identify how
those methods suit the question at hand.

A. Department of Interior’s Use of Probabilistic Inference
The DOI’s decision to protect polar bears offers a concrete illustration
of how agencies can articulate alternate methods of inference. Recall the
discussion of one method of inference, p-value, in Part I supra. In their
regulatory analysis of polar bears, the DOI employed a second type of

146.
Fisher et al., supra note 27, at 279–82.
147.
Note since the inferential methods generally run across entire programs or multiple
programs, they may only need to be made explicit once and can be referenced after that.
Thus the investment of energy and time in these meta-methodological decisions, which are
also the most consequential, may not be substantial when parsed out over a number of
regulatory projects.
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inferen
ntial method—the use of likelihoods and Bayesiian inference—
describbed in Figure 4 below.148

FIGURE 4. LOGIC BEHIND
E
BAYESSIAN INFEREENCE
AND LIKELIHOOD
DS

Proobabilistic inferencce rests on the prremise that patterrns in data of obsserved events can be
estimated
d by probability distributions that can
n be mathematicallly manipulated. Unnlike the method off pvalues, which
w
evaluates in
nferences based on
n whether empiriccal observations aare consistent withh a
theoreticcal distribution, the methods of likelihoods and Bayessian inference sharre a common goal:: to
estimate the
t theoretical distributions that best explaain the observed evennts—even when the information about thhese
events aree heterogeneous.
Bayyesian inference assumes that if multiple events are relaated, then the probbability distributionn of
each willl affect that of all the others. Thereffore, one should bee able to predict hoow altering one evvent
will influ
uence the others.
If one has empirical data, one can evaaluate competing thheoretical distribuutions (bottom grapph)
based on
n a probabilistic meeasure called the likelihood, which ccan be regarded as the p-value’s inverrse.
The likelihood measures th
he probability of a theoretical distribbution, given the eempirical (top grapph).
The mosst credible inferencce is the one based
d on the distributioon with the highesst likelihood (e.g., the
rightmosst distribution in th
he bottom graph).

148.

For an overvieew of Bayesian th
hinking, see Pascuual, supra note 255.
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Under the ESA, the DOI must identify endangered and threatened
species in need of protection.149 The former are in danger of extinction,
while the latter are likely to be so within the foreseeable future.150 The DOI
must make these determinations based on the best scientific and commercial data available to establish at least one of five factors: (1) present or
threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of habitat; (2) overuse
for commercial, recreational, scientific or educational purposes; (3) disease
or predation; (4) inadequacy of existing regulations; or (5) other factors
affecting continued existence.151
Among the methods the DOI used to synthesize and integrate the
scientific data on hand—thereby establishing the weight of evidence for the
polar bear’s threatened existence—was a computational model based on
Bayesian inference. Given the method’s underlying logic, the Bayesian
model served as a transparent tool to integrate multiple strands of evidence
into one cohesive system. The model (see Figure 5) consisted of three
components:
Nodes represent the causes and intermediary effects influencing polar
bear population. Note that the shaded boxes correspond to four
of the five ESA factors listed above.
Arrows link these nodes in a causal chain of events.
Probability distributions determine how the state of one node affects
the other nodes in the system.
Taken together, these three components summarized the evidential
narrative underlying the DOI’s regulatory decision. This model then served
as a formal means to integrate empirical data, expert judgment, model
results, and other information within the DOI’s assembled body of science.
Some of these evidential components were individual studies in which
evidence was evaluated by using p-values. The DOI’s model therefore
serves as an example of how multiple inferential methods may be used
concurrently to evaluate the overall weight of evidence.

149.
150.
151.

Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 4(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (2006).
Id. § 1532(6), (20).
Id. § 1533(a)(1)(A)–(E).
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FIGURE 5. BAYESIAN MODEL OF INTERIOR’S DECISION TO LIST
POLAR BEAR AS A THREATENED SPECIES

DOI’s model, based on Bayesian inference, has three components: nodes represent the system’s major
factors; arrows show the direction of causation; and probability distributions determine system behavior.
The shaded nodes are those which DOI must consider under its statutory mandate.

Based partially on this model’s results, the DOI in 2008 listed the polar
bear as a threatened species.152 Shortly thereafter, numerous plaintiffs
challenged the agency’s decision in court.153 One group claimed the animal
merited greater protection as an endangered species, while the other
claimed that the DOI should not have listed the animal at all. Both groups
argued that the DOI had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of
the APA.154
In its opinion, the district court acknowledged its narrow standard of
review under the APA and the deference it owed to the agency, particularly
for a regulatory decision requiring a high level of technical expertise.155 But
the court also emphasized its duty to hold the DOI to standards of rationality.156 Following this path, the court scrutinized the agency’s decision and
152.
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened
Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212,
28,274 (May 15, 2008)(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
153.
In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and § 4(d) Rule Litig., 794 F.
Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2011), aff ’d, Nos. 11–5219, 11–5221, 11–5222, 11–5223, 2013 WL 765059
(D.C. Cir., Mar. 1, 2013).
154.
Id. at 78.
155.
Id. at 80.
156.
The court noted that it would remand the agency’s rule if the agency “relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference
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upheld the DOI’s decision. In the course of its affirmance, the court
discussed the inferential challenges that lay before the DOI’s decisionmakers,
who needed
not only to evaluate a body of science that is both exceedingly
complex and rapidly developing, but also to apply that science in a
way that enabled them to make reasonable predictions about potential impacts over the next century to a species that spans
international boundaries. [They] considered over 160,000 pages of
documents and approximately 670,000 comment submissions from
state and federal agencies, foreign governments, Alaska Native
Tribes and tribal organizations, federal commissions, local governments, commercial and trade organizations, conservation
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private citizens.
[They] also consulted a number of impartial experts in a variety of
fields, including climate scientists and polar bear biologists.157
As In re Polar Bear reveals, interest groups did take issue with the
DOI’s model, but the developers of DOI’s model provided measures of
performance—based on model likelihoods, along with other techniques of
model evaluation—to demonstrate the model’s consistency with the evidence.
By clearly delineating its understanding of the system of factors affecting
polar bear populations and by declaring its judgment of the probable states
of these factors, the DOI made its method visible in such a way that helped
to focus discussion on the scientific merits and the appropriateness of its
choice of inferences. The visible methods properly refocused the debate on
the evidence and inferential choices rather than on the black-boxed result
(i.e., in favor or against classifying the polar bear as threatened) over which
the litigants disagreed.158 The DOI conceded that the model was only preliminary, that it was only one aspect of the evidence, and that it contained
many uncertainties.159 However, regardless of its results, the model helped
confirm other evidence regarding the direction and magnitude of the effects
of multiple stressors on polar bears.
The DOI’s Bayesian model was just one of several strands of evidence
used to justify the agency’s decision. Our focus on this model is intended to
emphasize how a variety of inferential methods can provide considerable
evidentiary illumination in settings where the available evidence is broadly
scattered and incomplete. As the court stated, the DOI did not rely on
in view or the product of agency expertise.” Id. (quoting Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
157.
Id. at 68–69.
158.
See Pascual, supra note 25.
159.
In re Polar Bear Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d at 107.
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existing data to establish statistically significant declines in polar bear populations. To justify its decision to list the species as threatened, the agency
used models to predict significant future declines.160 As we describe in
Figure 5 and the accompanying text, for one of its models, the agency used
Bayesian inference to communicate, in transparent and visible terms, the
probabilistic underpinnings of its model, as well as the analytical foundations of the model.161 The joint plaintiffs did not contest the agency’s choice
of models, only the manner in which they were applied.162 The challenge
from the joint plaintiffs therefore amounted to disagreements with the
agency’s judgments regarding the severity of climate change and of its
effects on polar bear habitats and therefore, on their populations. Given the
rational relationship between the agency’s models and the reality they were
purported to represent,163 none of these disagreements compelled the court
to abandon its deference to the agency in “an area characterized by scientific
and technological uncertainty . . . .”164

B. EPA’s Synthesis of Scientific Information on Air Pollutants
Our next example takes a step back and highlights how in at least one
program—the EPA’s setting of air quality standards—the agency not only
deploys multiple methods for inference and analysis, but has actually
institutionalized a process to ensure that, to the greatest extent possible,
methods are made visible.
As detailed in Section I, it is rarely the case that the weight of scientific
evidence on human health and environmental risk will rest on the results of
a single study. Typically, various strands of data, collected from multiple
science investigations, will have to be woven together to reach an inference.
And just as the multiple methods outlined in Figure 1 can be used to draw
inferences from the data in a single study, so too can these multiple methods
be used to integrate information from across multiple studies. Indeed, the
model for polar bear populations described in the previous section was the
DOI’s attempt to use Bayesian inference to computationally integrate
disparate information.
Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA must establish standards for ambient
air concentrations of pollutants that “may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare.”165 The EPA must revisit these so-called
160.
161.

Id. at 109.
For complete details, see STEVEN C. ARMSTRUP ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR,
FORECASTING THE RANGE-WIDE STATUS OF POLAR BEARS AT SELECTED TIMES IN THE
21ST CENTURY 12–19 (2007).
162.
In re Polar Bear Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d at 108 n.51.
163.
Id.
164.
Id. at 108 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
165.
Clean Air Act § 108(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) at least once every five
years.166 In doing so, it must consult with an independent, scientific
committee—the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC).167
Although not statutorily required to so, as a matter of course, the EPA
prepares reports to document the methods and the rationale it uses to
integrate the scientific information culled to justify the agency’s air
regulations.168 In these reports, the EPA divides the analytical project into
distinct steps that allow it to better articulate its methods of analysis.169
First, the EPA crystalizes the policy questions. In a second report, the EPA
then assembles and synthesizes the relevant scientific literature that has
bearing on those policy questions. In a third report, the EPA applies a
variety of alternative models to the available scientific literature to reach
predictions about air quality and public health impacts. The EPA concludes
the exercise with a report that explains for sophisticated policymakers the
key methodological steps that it used in the analysis, the range of conclusions
and uncertainties surrounding different possible standards, and highlights
research questions for the future.
Two recent legal challenges to the EPA’s NAAQS—one for nitrogen
dioxide (NO2) and another for particulate matter (PM2.5)—illuminate the
EPA’s institutionalized process for transparently integrating various methods
into its scientific inferences. In 2005, the EPA began to consider epidemiological and clinical evidence suggesting that respiratory illnesses were
occurring at lower NO2 concentrations and at shorter durations of exposure
than had previously been thought. The EPA published a call for information in the Federal Register,170 and in 2007, issued a research plan in which
it discussed the major science issues to be addressed, the methods it would
use, and its intent to present its results before the CASAC.171 In 2008, the
agency published its assessment of the science.172 The CASAC agreed with
166.
Id. § 7409(d)(1).
167.
See id. § 7409(d)(2)(A)–(B).
168.
See Process of Reviewing the National Ambient Air Quality Standards, U.S. EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/ttnnaaqs/review.html (last updated Dec. 10, 2012). Each criteria air
pollutant is listed on the left bar. By clicking the pollutant, one can view the various reports
that have been issued.
169.
See, e.g., NAAQS PROCESS REVIEW WORKGROUP, EPA, REVIEW OF THE
PROCESS FOR SETTING NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS E-1 (2006) available
at http://www.epa.gov/ttnnaaqs/pdfs/naaqs_process_report_march2006.pdf.
170.
Call for Information, 70 Fed. Reg. 73,236 (Dec. 9, 2005).
171.
EPA posted all of these planning documents on its website at Nitrogen Dioxide
(NO2) Primary Standards—Documents from Review Completed in 2010—Planning Documents,
U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/standards/nox/s_nox_cr_pd.html (last updated
Dec. 10, 2012).
172.
The EPA’s various drafts of its integrated science assessment are posted at Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2) Primary Standards—Documents from Review Completed in 2010—Integrated
Science Assessments, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/standards/nox/s_nox_cr_
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the EPA’s assessment. The EPA proposed new NAAQS in 2009 and
published its final rule in 2010.173 It bears highlighting that this entire
process involved notification in the Federal Register, multiple rounds of
public comment, and publication of the various science documents on the
web.
In American Petroleum Institute v. EPA,174 the petitioners claimed that
this NO2 standard was arbitrary and capricious under the APA because the
EPA misconstrued the scientific evidence and relied on non-peer reviewed
materials. The court concluded that on every alleged breach of scientific
judgment—i.e., that EPA ignored countervailing evidence regarding NO2’s
effect on respiratory illness; that it misused an epidemiology study; and
that it based the projections of the rule’s benefits on faulty assumptions—
the agency provided a reasoned defense of its inferences. The court
stated that “[p]erhaps the [petitioners themselves] should have had [their]
brief peer-reviewed.”175
On the other hand, in American Farm Bureau v. EPA,176 the court ruled
that the EPA was arbitrary and capricious in failing to explain adequately
why it did not consider certain scientific evidence that supported a more
stringent NAAQS for fine particulate matter.177 Just as it did when
developing the NO2 standard in the preceding paragraph, the EPA issued
the standard for PM2.5 after a process that entailed both the crafting of
reports to summarize the science behind the proposed NAAQS for PM2.5,
as well as consultations with the CASAC.178 The EPA’s political management, however, rejected the ultimate recommendations emerging from the
five-year scientific process and decided that the high costs of the standard,

isi.html (last updated Dec. 10, 2012), and its drafts of the risk and policy assessments are
posted at Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2) Primary Standards—Documents from Review Completed in
2010—Risk and Exposure Assessments, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/standards/
nox/s_nox_cr_rea.html (last updated Dec. 10, 2012).
173.
Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standard for Nitrogen Dioxide, 74 Fed.
Reg. 34,404 (proposed July 15, 2009); Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standard for
Nitrogen Dioxide, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,474 (Feb. 9, 2010)(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 58).
174.
Am. Petroleum Inst. & Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 1342 (D.C.
Cir. 2012).
175.
Id. at 1348.
176.
Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
177.
Id. at 522. Fine particulate matter, or PM2.5, consists primarily of soot particles
with diameter less than 2.5 nanometers. This air pollutant is linked to higher levels of
mortality and morbidity. See Particulate Matter, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/air/particlepollution/
(last updated Jan. 23, 2013).
178.
For an inventory of the various documents and drafts on EPA’s particulate
NAAQS review, as well as the comments and EPA’s responses, see Particulate Matter (PM)
Standards, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/standards/pm/s_pm_index.html (last updated
Dec. 20, 2012).
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coupled with evidentiary uncertainties, favored a less stringent standard.179
In reversing this final standard, the court compared it with the range of
plausible standards developed through the EPA’s institutionalized scientific
process, which provided a transparent and rigorously reviewed discussion of
methods and accompanying uncertainties.180 The court concluded that when
set against this robust scientific record, the EPA’s different final standard
lacked a rational basis.181
Both the polar bear and the EPA’s PM2.5 case illustrate that, once
methods are made visible, the agency’s ultimate conclusion rests on a more
solid foundation. Rather than being vulnerable to tangential nitpicking, the
articulation of methods provides support for standards that are the result of
multiple inferences, none of which can be firmly grounded in existing scientific knowledge. This is not to say that decisions will not be criticized or
that they will not be subject to challenge. Rather, the focus of criticisms and
challenges will be on the methods that are fundamental to the decision.
Again, to draw on our legal analogy, within legal scholarship we understand
the distinction between legitimate and irrelevant grounds of criticism in
relation to judgments. In the case of the EPA’s rules, moreover, the ability
of the EPA to point to this type of careful explication of its methods is a
relatively new and welcome innovation. The EPA only recently revised its
NAAQS process, and prior to this renovation, the EPA’s NAAQS process
suffered from the same invisibility of methods—and the accompanying
litigation, political controversy, and related strife—as most other agency
protective standards. The NAAQS process thus offers a valuable beforeand-after portrait of the institutional attributes of visible methods.

C. Encouraging Visible Methods by Adjusting Judicial Review
Because the EPA’s revised NAAQS process in large part resulted from
consistent, strong pressure from the courts and litigation, we close this
Section by considering ways that judicial review and court directives might
be used to affect a gradual shift away from existing incentives that tend to
reward the invisibility of methods. The role of the courts is important.
Indeed, judicial review of an agency decision is essentially the tail that wags
the regulatory dog; the EPA’s treatment of scientific evidence occurs in
expectation that the evidence will be the subject of considerable scrutiny in

179.
Juliet Eilperin, Proposed Standards for Air Quality Criticized, WASH. POST, Dec. 21,
2005, at A10 (describing the Bush Administration EPA’s decision to reject a more stringent
particulate standard despite strong scientific evidence, including CASAC endorsement, in
its favor).
180.
See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 559 F.3d at 520–24.
181.
Id.
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the courtroom.182 The courts therefore exert considerable influence in
compelling agencies to make their inferential methods visible and to ensure
that these visible methods conform to the APA’s mandate for rational
governance.
Given the ad hoc and context-specific nature of their task, it has not
been easy for courts to evaluate whether the inferential link between data
and inference tips the scale to a point where the weight of evidence supports an agency’s claim of a rational basis.183 Instead, given these challenges,
it has been easier for courts to effectively abrogate their responsibilities
under the APA and simply defer to agencies.184 As the court in In re Polar
Bear noted, however, while judicial review of regulatory science is narrow,
when conducting this review, courts should be able to understand what the
agency’s methods of inference were and why the agency deemed them
appropriate to the task at hand.185 Without such a basic explanation, the legal
community lacks a principled basis for evaluating regulatory science.
Under our proposal, the courts should compel the visibility of methods
by ensuring that the agencies provide answers to two deceptively simple
questions: (1) Have the agency’s methods of inference been identified? and
(2) Does the agency explain how its methods are appropriate to the information on
hand and how they support the ultimate inference used by the agency? Unless an
agency can respond to both these questions in the affirmative, then the
agency’s science-based decisions should risk reversal or remand by the
courts. Courts already require an “explanation” of the agency’s choices.186
Our proposal requires that the agency describe how it drew its inferences
and identify the specific assumptions it made in the course of assembling
the scientific evidence.
For example, because the FDA persisted in using p-values and randomized, clinical trials to evaluate Vioxx even when evidence indicated variable
response to Vioxx within a heterogeneous population, the answer to both
questions would have been a resounding “no.”187 Because the DOI explained
how it used and decided upon the underlying probabilities and how it evaluated its model to estimate polar bear population, the court could answer
both questions in the affirmative.188 The EPA’s detailed explication of its
182.
The statement is based on the primary author’s personal observation based on
almost twenty years of experience working on regulatory science.
183.
See Pascual, supra note 25; Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman,
Chevron, State Farm, and EPA in the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 ELR 10371 (Apr.
2001).
184.
Schroeder & Glicksman, supra note 183.
185.
See 794 F. Supp. 2d 95 (D.D.C. 2011).
186.
See, e.g., Meazell, supra note 121, at 738, 778–79 (discussing how the courts tend to
require explanations from the agency regarding its science-based decisions).
187.
See supra Part I.B.
188.
See supra, Part III.A.
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methods of analysis, embodied in a succession of reports each of which was
subject to expert review and public comment, provided a solid bottom to a
final nitrogen dioxide standard that emerged from that process. This same
institutionalized process also spotlighted the lack of support for a PM2.5
standard that diverged from agency staff and peer reviewer recommendations.
Under this proposal, once the agency believes that it can stand by its
methods and respond affirmatively to these two questions, the burden
should shift to those who would challenge the agency’s scientific conclusions. Challengers currently gain credit by launching critiques against the
agency’s findings that highlight missed studies or data, flawed assumptions,
or unaccounted for differences between the agency’s model and the real
world.189 In most cases, participants are not required to show how their
preferred variables, studies, or assumptions serve as a definitive improvement over the agency’s version. The courts should require challengers to
demonstrate that their methods mark a decided improvement over the
agencies’ approach.
Rather than positioning the challengers in a way that encourages sandbagging and second-guessing, under this proposal the challengers serve as
constructive contributors to the development of more robust methods.
Moreover, since challengers must give the agency notice of their criticisms
in the comments, the agency will have the benefit of alternative methods
during notice and comment and can account for innovations and other
salient arguments earlier in the process.

CONCLUSION
In today’s political climate, the terms “sound science” and “junk
science” are bandied about by both ends of the political spectrum to
advance their own regulatory agenda. Lost in the cacophony over scientific
evidence is the cautionary statement offered by the scientist Werner
Heisenberg: “[W]hat we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to
our method of questioning.”190 We do not argue for some form of positivism
or for a naïve search for objectivity. Rather, we contend that agencies make
their “methods of questioning” visible so that courts can determine “the

189.
See, e.g., 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4, at 594
(5th ed. 2010) (“If a comment criticizes in detail some characteristic of the agency’s proposed rule, and the agency retains that characteristic in the final rule without including in its
statement of basis and purpose a relatively detailed response to that criticism, a reviewing
court is likely to hold the rule unlawful . . . .”).
190.
WERNER HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY: THE REVOLUTION IN MODERN
SCIENCE 26 (1958).
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crucial difference between what is well or badly constructed, well or badly
composed.”191
Making methods visible is only the first of several analytical steps—the
methods also must be robust and appropriate for the analysis at hand.192 Yet
until this first step is taken, we can only stab in the dark and imagine what
inferential methods and analytical assumptions the agency might have
employed. As this article details, agencies can do better. Methods can be
made visible. And when they are, the discussion lays the essential foundation
for ensuring a more productive approach to using science for regulation.

191.
Latour, supra note 70, at 474 (emphasis omitted)(arguing for a ‘compositionist
manifesto’ in which scholarship moves beyond simple critique). We recognize that culture
will shape the answer to this question. See Sheila Jasanoff, A New Climate For Society, 27
THEORY, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 233 (2010).
192.
We are not blind to the fact that a “cook-book” approach to inference would lead
to more definite legal outcomes. Courts could insist that statistical significance—based on
the method of p-values, as applied to the results of controlled, randomized trials—is the best
and only way to substantiate the weight of evidence. To do so would be a legal fiction that
contravenes scientific thinking. See J. Worrall, Causality in Medicine: Getting Back to the Hill
Top, 53 PREVENTIVE MED. 235 (2011). To do so would perpetuate an irrational approach to
rationality. We are similarly aware that a pluralistic approach to inferential methods has
profound and far-reaching consequences on how the legal community understands causation.
See R. Scheines, Causation, Truth, and the Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 959 (2007). We look
forward to addressing these complications in future work.
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